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This paper investigates the effect of a going concern opinion (GCO) on the equity value of the 
announcing  firm’s  competitors.  On  average,  GCOs  increase  the  value  of  a  value-weighted 
portfolio of rivals by 0.37% at the event date. This positive effect is significantly larger when the 
announcing firm is relatively more profitable, the industry is more concentrated, and when rivals 
and event firms have distinct assets in place and growth opportunities. Additional tests reveal 
that such competitive effect is not a mere short-term phenomenon as investors can earn up to 
1.54%  on  a  risk-adjusted  basis  over  the  first  postGCO  month.  This  finding  is  especially 
interesting as we show that for the industry rivals the one-year and six-month preGCO risk-
adjusted equity returns are, on average, strongly negative. Our results highlight the impact of 
mandatory accounting information on market prices at both the firm and industry levels.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates to what extent the disclosure of a going concern opinion (GCO) report 
affects the stock price performance of the announcing firm’s industry rivals. We find that, on 
average, GCOs lead to an important competitive effect, with investors earning around 0.37% on 
risk-adjusted basis at the event date and a further 1.54% over the first postGCO month. Our main 
contribution  to  the  literature  is  showing  that  qualified  audit  reports  significantly  impact  the 
risk/return  characteristics  of  the  announcing  firm’s  publicly-traded  competitors.  A  few  other 
studies already show that GCO firms earn strong negative abnormal returns both in the short- 
and longer-run (e.g., Fleak and Wilson, 1994; Taffler, Lu and Kausar, 2004; Kausar, Taffler and 
Tan 2009; Menon and Williams, 2010). However, little is known about how such acute and 
unambiguous  bad  news  event  is  priced  on  industry  rivals.  Indeed,  the  four  previous  studies 
examining parallel questions we are aware of consider only a small number of GCOs and focus 
explicitly on particular industries.
1 This, however, is an important area of research as it may help 
shed further light on the importance of audit opinions and mandatory accounting information for 
the timing of transactions in financial markets. 
Whether the disclosure of a GCO report leads to an intra-industry pricing effect is clearly an 
empirical question. In fact, one can argue that such event should not be relevant for the pricing of 
the announcing firm’s rivals as, by definition, it is firm-specific. However, we can also argue the 
opposite case. Indeed, costumers should have an incentive to shift their demand to competitors 
when one of the  firms  in the industry  receives a  GCO.  In this case, nonGCO rivals should 
experience a sustainable increase in their market share and cash-flow generation potential, which 
would translate into higher market valuations. On the other hand, the market may penalize both 
the announcing firm and its industry rivals if it believes the GCO signals that the entire industry 
is financially distressed. 
We explore this issue using a large sample 670 GCO events occurring in the U.S. between 
01/01/1994 and 12/31/2005. In the first part of the paper, we show that the announcing firms 
lose, on average, 3.31% of their equity value on a risk-adjusted basis over a three-day window 
                                                 
1 Schaub, Watters and Lin (2003) study five GCO announcements in the computer industry, while Elliott and Schaub (2004) 
examine one GCO event in the home health care industry. Elliot, Highfield and Schaub (2006) and Schaub (2006) study four 
GCO cases in the real estate industry and seven GCO announcements in the electric services industry, respectively.  
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centered on the GCO date. Moreover, in an original contribution to the literature, we find that 
GCOs  lead  to  an  intra-industry  competitive  effect  that  is  both  statistically  and  economically 
significant. In particular, at the announcement date, the value of the value-weighted (equally 
weighted) portfolio of industry rivals increases, on average, 0.37% (0.24%) on a risk-adjusted 
basis. Using very conservative assumptions, we find that such small percentage increase in the 
rivals’  market  price  actually  amounts  to  over  $171  billion,  in  2009  constant  dollars,  clearly 
demonstrating the economic importance of our findings. We further show that the cross-sectional 
variation  in  the  industry  rivals’  abnormal  returns  effect  is  stronger  when  industries  are  less 
competitive and when rivals have distinct assets in place and growth opportunities vis-à-vis those 
of  the  announcing  firms.  In  addition,  the  GCO  competitive  effect  is  stronger  when  the 
announcing  firm  is  more  profitable  but  is  mitigated  when  a  positive  earnings  surprise  is 
contemporaneous to the disclosure of the qualified audit report. 
In the second part of the paper we explore the stock price performance of the announcing 
firms and their industry peers at longer horizons. Using size and book-to-market (SBM) risk 
adjusted buy-and-hold returns we find that, on average, the value of the value-weighted (equally 
weighted) portfolio of industry competitors decreases around 9.3% (9.6%) over the one year 
period leading up to the GCO date. The parallel figure for the announcing firms is -74.4%. Such 
abnormal returns, which are significant at conventional levels, suggest that both event firms and 
their nonevent competitors are penalized by the market before GCO is publicly known. Our 
results for the postevent period reveal a different pattern. In particular, our tests show that the 
value-weighted (equally weighted) industry portfolio actually earns, on average, a positive and 
statistically  significant  abnormal  return  of  1.5%  (1.9%)  over  the  first  postGCO  month;  the 
announcing firms’ average abnormal return computed over the same period is not significant. For 
the one-year period following the GCO disclosure, we find that GCO firms lose, on average, 
15.9% of their market value; the parallel figure for the industry portfolio is not significant. The 
disclosure of the GCO thus seem to have an important impact on the pricing of both event and 
nonevent firms, contributing to minimize (at least) some of the preGCO uncertainty surrounding 
the industry members. Finally, additional tests show that, in the longer-run, competitors tend to 4 
 
be more favorably affected if the announcing firm and its industry rivals have distinct assets in 
place and growth opportunities and when the GCO firm is relatively more profitable. 
Our  paper  allows  us  to  make  several  contributions  to  the  accounting  literature.  First,  we 
explore how the disclosure of a GCO impacts the market value of the announcing firm’s industry 
rivals thus complementing previous studies focusing exclusively on GCO firms (Jones, 1996; 
Fleak  and  Wilson,  1994;  Kausar  et  al.,  2009;  Menon  and  Williams,  2010)  and  studies  that, 
although exploring similar issues, are limited in both depth and breadth (Schaub et al., 2003; 
Elliott and Schaub, 2004; Elliot et al., 2006; Schaub 2006). Second, we add to the literature 
examining how public bad news events impact industry rivals’ shareholder value. For instance, 
Lang and Stulz (1992) and Jorion and Zhang (2007) look at the announcement of bankruptcy 
while Jorion and Zhang (2010) examine the intra-industry effects of bond downgrades. Our study 
differs from the existing literature as we focus on an accounting event that is motivated by a 
mandatory requirement with cyclical nature. As such, we are able to shed light on the importance 
of accounting regulations for the functioning of financial markets. Finally, we also contribute to 
the body of research suggesting that the stock market takes time to assimilate public bad news 
events (e.g, Ball and Brown, 1968; Foster, Olsen and Shevlin, 1984; Bernard and Thomas, 1989, 
1990;  Kausar  et  al.,  2009)  by  showing  that  a  market  pricing  anomaly,  resulting  from  the 
disclosure  of  a  public  bad  news,  may  affect  both  the  announcing  firm  and  its  industry 
competitors.  
In the next section we briefly resume the relevant literature and in section 3 we present our 
data. Sections 4 and 5 discuss the short and long-term impact of a GCO report on the industry’s 
market price, respectively. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature and research hypothesis 
The  going-concern  principle  is  one  of  the  most  important  accounting  assumptions  in  the 
preparation of financial statements. This principle assumes that a company is ordinarily viewed 
as continuing in business for the foreseeable future. SAS No. 59 (AICPA 1988) requires auditors 
to assess a client’s going concern status. In particular, the auditor is required to modify the audit 
report when, after considering all relevant information, has substantial doubts about the entity’s 5 
 
ability to continue as a going-concern. Because these independent auditors generally have access 
to  information  not  reported  in  financial  statements,  new  and  important  perspectives  may  be 
gleaned from audit opinions.  
Prior  studies  have  examined  the  stock  return  performance  GCO  companies.  For  instance, 
Jones (1996) observes negative returns around the announcement date for 68 firms receiving a 
GCO. Similarly, Fleak and Wilson (1994) find that 144 GCO firms experience negative returns 
when compared with distressed firms receiving unmodified opinions. Very recently, Menon and 
Williams (2010) show that the abnormal returns associated with a GCO are more negative when 
the audit report cites a problem with obtaining financing or when it triggers a technical violation 
of a debt covenant. Additionally, Kausar et al. (2009) find that the market does not process the 
GCO signal on a timely basis in the U.S., leading to a significant market underreaction of -14% 
over the following 12-month period. Similar evidence is presented by Taffler et al. (2004) for the 
U.K. market, with their sample firms underperforming on a risk-adjusted basis by between 24% 
and 31% over a one-year post-event period. 
While the recent evidence supports the belief that firms announcing GCOs typically suffer 
negative abnormal returns, the effects of GCO announcements on industry rivals are ill explored. 
We  specifically  address  this  issue  by  shedding  light  on  how  mandatory  public  accounting 
information impacts the market price of the industry competitors. In general, abnormal returns of 
rivals reacting to the unfavorable news of the announcing firm may be either negative, positive 
or there may be no abnormal returns at all. The absence of abnormal returns suggests that the 
negative  news  being  relayed  to  the  market  does  not  affect  the  fundamental  risk/return 
characteristics of the industry. When stock prices of industry rivals adjust in the same direction 
as the stock price of the announcing firm, a contagion effect is said to occur. This suggests that 
the information being released is interpreted by market participants to reveal new, industry-wide 
economic conditions. When prices of industry rivals adjust in the opposite direction to that of the 
announcing firm, a competitive effect is said to occur. For these cases, the market perceives the 
event  as  being  specific  to  the  announcing  firm  leading  to  a  transfer  of  wealth  from  the 
announcing firm to its industry rivals. Prior empirical studies suggest that these three scenarios 
are  likely  to  occur.  For  instance,  Laux,  Starks  and  Yoon  (1998)  find  that  rivals  of  firms 6 
 
announcing large dividend revisions post statistically insignificant abnormal returns. Aharony 
and Swary (1983) and Gay, Timme and Yung (1991) find evidence of a contagion effect in the 
banking industry as a result of bank failure while Lang and Stulz (1992) and Jorion and Zhang 
(2007) reach similar conclusions for a general sample of bankrupt firms. Sun and Tang (1998) 
report  negative  and  significant  abnormal  returns  for  rival  in  the  industry  after  downsizing 
announcements. Finally, Jorion and Zhang (2010) find that an intra-industry competitive effect 
exists following bond downgrades when firms are previously classified as being speculative-
grade. 
There are good reasons to expect a GCO report to impact the market price of the industry 
rivals. GCOs are an unequivocal signal that the announcing firm is at risk of becoming insolvent 
in the short-run. Industry rivals may benefit from this situation as costumers refrain from doing 
business with the announcing firm (perhaps simply due to a reputational effect) and shift their 
demand to its competitors. If industry rival’s market share increases, a positive impact in the 
stock prices is expected to occur as a consequence of an increase in sales, earnings and operating 
cash-flows. However, the opposite situation may also occur if investors believe that the GCO 
report is just the first of many to come because of structural issues affecting the profitability and 
cash-flow generation potential of the entire industry. In this case, each GCO report should have a 
cumulative negative impact on the industry. Finally, GCO may have no meaningful impact on 
industry competitor’s market price if investors believe that such event is simply firm-specific.  
Interestingly, and to the best of our knowledge, only four studies investigate the impact of 
GCOs on industry rivals. Schaub et al. (2003) explore five GCOs in the computer industry and 
document the existence of a contagion effect. In contrast, Elliott and Schaub (2004) examine one 
GCO case in two industries within the home health care sector and conclude that a competitive 
effect dominates. Similarly, Elliot et al. (2006) investigate the intra-industry pricing effects of 
four GCO events in the real estate industry and find modest evidence supporting a competitive 
effect among competitors. Finally, Schaub (2006) considers seven GCOs in the electric services 
industry and reports that a contagion effect dominates in half of the cases he considers. Despite 
the interest and relevance of these previous studies, the matter of fact is that all of them are 7 
 
limited in both breadth and depth, and yield conflicting results. As such, and drawing on the 
above discussion, below we explore the following main research hypothesis: 
There is no competitive or contagion effect on industry rivals following the announcement of 
a GCO report. 
 
3. Data 
We use 10k Wizard’s free text search tool to identify all firms present in EDGAR that receive 
a GCO report from 01/01/1994 to 12/31/2005. The combination of keywords employed is “raise 
substantial doubt” and “ability to continue as a going concern”. From the 29,102 initial results, 
we exclude 16,866 cases because firms are not found in the CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged file. 
Drawing  on  recent  studies  addressing  GCOs  firms  (Taffler  et  al.  2004;  Ogneva  and 
Subramanyam, 2007; Kausar et al., 2009; Menon and Williams, 2010), we consider only first-
time GCOs cases in our final sample, i.e., firms receiving a GCO and that did not receive a GCO 
in  the  previous  year.  We  delete  another  1,017  cases  because  we  could  not  find  accounting 
information on COMPUSTAT or because the firms do not trade common stock on the NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ during the 12-months that predate the GCO report. Next, utilities and 
financial firms are removed as well as foreign companies, so as to ensure a consistent legal 
framework. Firms classified as “in a development stage” or that had already filed for bankruptcy 
are also dropped from the sample.
2  
In the last step we look for the industry rivals. Following Lang and Stulz (1992), we define 
industry affiliation using the four-digit SIC code present in the COMPUSTAT file, which is 
assessed on the year of the GCO report both for the announcing firm and its industry rivals. We 
exclude from the final sample the GCO cases for which we cannot find at least one industry rival 
on COMPUSTAT and/or the industry rivals do not have sufficient data available on the CRSP 
daily file.  
As shown in panel A of Table 1, our final sample includes a total of 670 first-time GCOs, 
which correspond to 630 individual firms. Our GCO firms trade mainly on the Nasdaq (75.6%); 
                                                 
2 In contrast to Lang and Stulz (1992), we do not impose a minim debt level to include the GCO firms in the sample since 
Haensly et al. (2001) show that doing so biases the results in favor of finding an intra-industry effect. 8 
 
an additional 15.9% trade on the AMEX, and the remaining 8.5% on the NYSE. In addition, 
panel B of Table 1 shows that our GCO events are reasonably spread across our sample period 
although we do see a concentration of cases in 2001 and 2002, which coincides with the burst of 





The 670 first-time GCOs cover 177 four-digit SIC industries. Hence, if a given industry has 
several GCO events in the sample we keep each announcement so as to reflect the industry’s 
shifting composition (Lang and Stulz, 1992). Eighty-two industries have a single GCO case and 
a further 66 industries have between 2 and 5 cases. The services-prepackaged software industry 
(SIC code 7372), that with the highest relative frequency of GCOs, accounts for 55 first-time 
incidents, followed by the services-computer programming, data processing and similar (SIC 
code 7370), with 31 cases. Portfolios from the same industry may include some of the same 
companies but usually have financial data from different fiscal years.
3 Importantly, we delete all 
GCO firms from the rival portfolios so as to eliminate any potential contamination in the results. 
On average, industry portfolios have 12.3 rival firms (standard deviation = 15.5); the respective 
median is 6. The maximum (minimum) number of rival firms in an industry portfolio is 69 (1). 
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics for the announcing and rival firms. On average, 
GCO  firms  are  small  (mean  market  capitalization  =  $34.1  million;  mean  revenue  =  $159.4 
million), clearly unprofitable (mean ROE = -186.6%; median ROE = -88.1%)
4 and unable to 
generate positive operational cash-flow (mean cash-flow from operations = -$10.7 million). Not 
surprisingly, GCO firms are highly financially distressed one year in advance of receiving the 
qualified audit report. In fact, the mean Z-score is 0.6, which puts them at a high risk of being 
forced into bankruptcy in the short-run. Around three-quarters of the GCO firms are audited by a 
Big 4 accounting firm.  
                                                 
3 With the exception of the years 2001 and 2002 (2001), the GCO events are evenly spread over our sample period for the 
services-prepackaged software industry (services-computer programming, data processing and similar). In untabulated results we 
drop these two industries/years and rerun our analysis. Our conclusions do not change. 
4 Firms with non-positive total equity are excluded from our ROE computations as not doing so would distort the analysis of the 
results. 





The typical industry is much bigger than the individual GCO firm (mean market capitalization 
= $4,256 million; mean revenue = $1,705.2 million). Industry rivals are also unprofitable (mean 
ROE = -39.5%) but enjoy a better financial position than the GCO firms (mean cash-flow from 
operations = 224.9%). The mean value for our bankruptcy likelihood proxy is -4.5, suggesting 
that the typical firm within our industries is not at risk of failing in the short-term.  
 
4. Valuation effects of the announcement of a GCO: short-term analysis 
In this section we investigate the short-term valuation effects associated with GCOs for both 
the announcing firms and their industry rivals.  
 
 
4.1. Initial evidence 
We use a standard event study to explore how  a GCO report impacts  market prices.  For 
announcing firm j, we compute the abnormal return in day t ( , j t AR ) as: 
( ) , , , j t j t j t AR r E r = −   (1) 
where  , j t r  is day t return for the announcing firm j, and  ( ) , j t E r  is  the expected return for such 
firm/trading day.  ( ) , j t E r is estimated using the market model. In our application, the proxy for 
the market portfolio is the CRSP value weighted portfolio, and the parameters of the model are 
estimated over a 200 trading-day window ending 50 days before the disclosure date of the firm’s 
GCO report. Moreover, the beta estimate is adjusted as in Scholes and Williams (1977) so has to 
overcome the bias arising from the infrequent trading of financially distressed firms.  
Next, for event day t, the average abnormal return ( t AR ) is defined as: 










= ∑   (2) 
where  , j t AR  is given by equation (1) and n is the number of firms. The significance of the 
average abnormal returns is accessed using Z-statistics computed as in Boehmer, Musumeci, and 
Poulsen (1991).
5 
We  broadly  follow  Lang  and  Stulz  (1992)  when  computing  the  abnormal  returns  of  the 
industry rivals. As mentioned in section 3, industry portfolios are comprised of all firms with the 
same four-digit SIC code as the announcing firm that have stock returns available on CRPS. To 
reduce  survival  bias,  rivals  are  included  in  the  industry  portfolio  even  if  they  do  not  have 
reported returns for all days in the estimation or event periods.
6 Industry portfolio abnormal 
returns are computed as prediction errors for the portfolio return, with Lang and Stulz (1992) 
noting that such procedure accounts for the cross-sectional dependence among companies in 
each  portfolio.  In  practice,  we  employ  the  method  above  to  compute  the  rivals’  portfolio 
abnormal  returns  but  with  one  exception.  Indeed,  using  the  Scholes  and  Williams  (1977) 
technique is unnecessary since, in this case, the prediction errors are for portfolios of competitor 
companies, not the GCO firms’ themselves (see also Haensly et al., 2001). Hence, for the rival 
portfolios,  ( ) , j t E r is  estimated  using  the  OLS  betas  from  our  market  model  regression.  For 
completeness we present results using both equal and value-weighting schemes for the industry 
portfolios. 
Table 3 summarizes our results. Panel A shows that, on average, the market price of the 
announcing firms falls  by 1.69%  (p<0.001) on a  risk-adjusted basis at the event date  and a 
further 1.9% (p<0.01) and 1.1% (p=0.035) on event days +1 and +2, respectively. None of the 
pre-event abnormal returns are statistically significant at conventional levels. This suggest that 
the market is unable to anticipate the release of the GCO but reacts very negatively once the 
audit report becomes publicly known. Our evidence is in line with the recent findings of Menon 
                                                 
5 Using cross-sectional t-statistics or Pattel’s (1976) test statistic yields essentially the same results. These are available upon 
request from the first author.  
6 Rivals have to have at least 60 observations in the estimation period to be kept in the industry portfolio.  11 
 
and Williams (2010) and shows that GCO reports clearly provide new and important value-





Our original results are, however, reported in panel B of Table 3. As can been seen, the 
average abnormal returns for both the value-weighted (VW) and equally weighted (EW) rival 
portfolios are positive and statistically significant at the event date: 0.37% (p<0.001) and 0.24% 
(p=0.023), respectively. Hence, the announcement of a GCO report leads to an intra-industry 
competitive effect, which seems to be driven by the biggest rival firms in the industry.  
As Lang and Stulz (1992) emphasize, in general, the market capitalization of any individual 
firm is considerably smaller than that of the industry it belongs to. As such, in practice, the 
relative small percentage gain we document for our industry rivals may actually correspond to a 
very significant dollar amount. We examine the economic importance of the GCO competitive 
effect by assuming that the equity market value of each of our rival firms increases by 0.24% at 
the GCO date. Using this conservative assumption, we estimate the GCO competitive effect to be 
worth around $171.6 billion, in 2009 constant dollars. We also estimate the loss sustained by 
announcing firms’ shareholders assuming that each firm loses 1.69% of its equity market value 
at the GCO date. This translates into an aggregate loss of $26.6 billion, in 2009 constant dollars. 
In other words, industry rivals gain, on average, $0.52 for each dollar lost by the GCO firms at 
the announcement date.  
In Table 4 we re-examine our results using cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). For each 
announcing firm j, the cumulative abnormal return over period τ is: 
2
1




=∑   (3) 
where  , j t AR  is defined as in equation (1). Individual CARs for a given time interval τ are then 
averaged cross-sectionally as follows: 
 








CAR n CAR τ τ
=
= ∑   (4) 
where  , i CAR τ  is defined as in (3), and n  is the number firms.
7  A similar framework is used for 
the industry rivals.  
Panel A of Table 4 shows that the GCO negatively affects the market price of the event firms 
on a risk-adjusted basis. In effect, the average CAR for the announcement period ranges from -
1.39% (p<0.01) to -3.31% (p<0.01), depending on the event window we consider. Importantly, 
the  one-week  average  preevent  CAR  is  not  significant  at  conventional  levels;  its  postevent 
equivalent is, however, positive and significant at better than the 1% level. This suggests the 
market is unable to anticipate the GCO but seems to overreact once it becomes publicly known. 





In panel B of Table 4 we focus on the rival firms. There is again evidence suggesting that, on 
average, the GCO leads to an important industry competitive effect. The average VW industry 
CAR for the (-1;0) window is 0.41% (p=0.01) and is 0.36% (p=0.07) for the more extended (-
1;1) period. Results computed using equal weights are similar, albeit somewhat weaker both 
statistically and in magnitude. This again suggests that the GCO competitive effect is driven by 
the largest industry rivals. 
To summarize, this sub-section shows that GCOs convey important information to the market. 
Our computations indicate that, on average, the market price of the announcing firms falls by 
1.69% on a risk-adjusted basis at the event date, with a cumulative loss of around 3.31% being 
document for the full (-1;1) period. Our evidence also suggests that such decline in the stock 
price may be excessive since the one-week postGCO average CARs is positive and significant, a 
clear  indication  of  market  overreaction.  Our  main  concern,  however,  is  with  the  pricing 
implication of GCOs on the industry rivals. We find that such event leads to a competitive intra-
                                                 
7 Using buy-and-hold abnormal returns does not alter the nature of our conclusions. Results are available upon request from the 
first author.  
Table 4 here 13 
 
industry effect, which is both economically and statistically significant. At the GCO date, the 
VW stock price of the industry rivals increases, on average, 0.37% on a risk-adjusted basis, 
which we conservatively estimate to be worth around $171.6 billion, in 2009 constant dollars. 
Moreover, our results suggest that the GCO competitive effect is concentrated on the largest rival 
firms, as our VW results are always greater in magnitude than their EW counterparts.  
 
4.2. Multivariate evidence 
Short-term industry effects may vary significantly due to industry or firm characteristics, as 
suggested by Lang and Stulz (1992), Jorion and Zhang (2007) and Zhang (2010) among others. 
We analyze the importance of such effects in our research setting with the help of equation (5): 
4 3 11 4
0 , , , ,
1 1 1 1
i m i m n i n i t i j i
m n t j
CAR Ind Firm yeardum Indum α λ δ ε
= = = =
= + + + + + ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑   (5) 
where  , i CAR τ  is industry i´s CAR over the (-1;0) period,  , i m Ind  represents a set of industry 
related characteristics,  , i n Firm  stands for a set of GCO firm-specific characteristics,  , i t yeardum  
and , i j Indum  represent year and industry dummies, respectively and  i ε is the error term, assumed 
to be white noise.
8  
The  first  industry  characteristic  we  consider  is  leverage  (Ind_Lev).  A  priori,  the  relation 
between the GCO competitive effect and industry leverage is ambiguous. In effect, on the one 
hand, all else being equal, an increase in the industry’s debt ratio should strengthen the GCO 
competitive effect since leverage magnifies the impact on the return on equity resulting from the 
(potential) increase in net earnings accruing to the nonGCO firms. On the other hand, increased 
leverage  also  reduces  firms’  ability  to  invest  and,  consequently,  to  exploit  changes  in  their 
competitive  position  (Bolton  and  Scharfstein,  1990).  Following  Haensly  et  al.  (2001),  we 
compute the ratio of total debt to total assets at the firm level and then use the industry’s average 
debt level when estimating equation (5).
9 
                                                 
8 Industry dummies are defined according to Professor Keneth French’s five industry portfolios.  
See http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_5_ind_port.html for more details (accessed on 
06/09/2011).  
9 Haensly et al. (2001) show that using only long-term debt to define industry leverage as in Lang and Stulz (1992) bias the 
results in favor of finding a contagion effect in the case of bankruptcy announcements. In untabulated results, however, we rerun 14 
 
Competition is the second industry characteristic we consider in our analysis (Ind_Conc). In 
less than fully competitive industries, an increase in demand should translate into higher equity 
valuations as firms can raise the price they charge for their current output. It is plausible that 
receiving  a  GCO  audit  report  leads  to  a  negative  reputational  effect,  which  should  result  in 
costumers shifting their demand to the nonGCM firms. Consequently, industry concentration 
should magnify the GCO competitive effect. We use the Herfindahl ratio to proxy for the degree 
of industry competition (Lang and Stulz, 1992), which is computed as the squared sum of the 
fractions of the industry sales by the nonGCO firms.
10   
The GCO competitive effect should be smaller (or even inexistent) when the industry shares a 
similar cash-flow pattern vis-à-vis that of the announcing firm. Indeed, when this is the case, 
investors  are  less  likely  to  perceive  the  GCO  as  being  firm-specific,  which  in  turn,  should 
negatively affect the market price of all the other firms in the industry. Drawing on Lang and 
Stulz (1992), we assess the level of cash-flow similarity (Ind_CF) by computing the correlation 
between the raw returns of the industry and its respective announcing GCO over the one period 
preceding the GCO disclosure date.  
Lang  and  Stulz  (1992)  mention  a  possible  interaction  between  industry  leverage  and 
competition. As argued above, high industry concentration should magnify the intra-industry 
GCO competitive effect. However, the extent to which this is actually reflected on stock prices 
depends on the industry’s leverage ratio. The average indebtedness of the industry constraints 
competitors’ ability to expand their business and influences the response of the return on equity 
to fluctuations in market share. Following Haensly et al. (2001), we include an interaction term 
between industry leverage and competition in our regression model to explicitly capture this joint 
effect (Lev_Con), which we compute as Ind_Lev times Ind_Conc.  
Three GCO firm-specific characteristics are also considered in our regression model. The first 
is  size,  which  captures  the  information  environment  surrounding  the  announcing  firms 
(GCO_Size).
11 In a recent paper, Ittonen (2010) shows that size mitigates the negative returns 
                                                                                                                                                             
our analysis defining leverage as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets or total liabilities to total assets. Our findings do not 
change and are available upon request from the first author.  
10 Our results, however, do not change if we include the GCO firms in the computation of the Herfindahl ratio. 
11 Size is measured as the log of the GCO firm’s total assets, collected from COMPUSTAT one calendar year before the GCO 
disclosure year.  15 
 
associated with the going concern information around the audit report date, a result he attributes 
to a decrease in the information asymmetry affecting the GCO firms. It follows that investors are 
less likely to be surprised at the GCO date as the size of the announcing firm increases. This, in 
turn,  should  lead  to  the  GCO  competitive  effect  being  concentrated  on  the  smallest  of  the 
announcing firms.  
It is well-established that the market has problems assimilating earnings surprises, especially 
when  they  are  negative  (e.g.,  Bernard  and  Thomas,  1989  and  1990;  Fama,  1998).  This  is 
important as investors are likely to become aware and react to the earnings figures at the same 
time they learn about the qualified audit report. Drawing on Foster et  al. (1984), we define 
earnings surprise as the ratio of the difference of the current quarterly earnings figure and the 
earnings figure reported by the firm in the previous quarter to the absolute value of the firm’s 
current quarter earnings. We then use a dummy variable (SUE_d) to separate cases where a 
positive earnings surprise occurs at the 10k’s disclosure date (dummy equals one) from all the 
other cases.  
Profitability  is  the  last  GCO  firm-specific  variable  we  consider  in  equation  (5).  In  our 
application, we proxy for firm profitability (GCO_ROA) using the return on assets ratio, which 
we compute as earnings before interest and taxes to total assets.
12 This ratio captures the ability 
of the firm to use its assets to generate earnings, with higher values usually indicating increased 
levels of economic efficiency and managerial talent. We expect the GCO competitive effect to be 
stronger when the announcing firm is relatively more profitable as this amounts to a more able 
competitor being likely to be forced out of the market within a short period of time.  
Panel A of Table 5 present summary statistics for the independent variables. As can be seen, 
on average, our industries do not carry much debt on their balance sheet (mean = 0.21; median = 
0.15) and seem to relatively concentrated (Ind_Conc for = 0.56; median = 0.50). In addition, 
rivals’ pre-event raw returns are not strongly correlated with those of the announcing firms, 
which suggests that event and nonevent firms have distinct assets in place and/or investment 
opportunity sets. Panel A of Table 5 again shows that the GCO firms are small, with mean 
(median) total assets of $201.4 ($21.9) million and are not profitable, with mean and median 
                                                 
12 Both figures collected from the 10k report published one year prior to the GCO disclosure year. 16 
 
return on assets is -0.49 and -0.26, respectively. Finally, panel A of Table 5 shows that GCOs are 
very often accompanied by a contemporaneous negative earnings surprise, emphasizing the need 
for controlling for the impact of such effect in our results.  
Panel  B  of  Table  5  resumes  the  Pearson  correlations  coefficients  estimated  for  our  main 
independent  variables.  The  largest  coefficient  we  find  is  29.1%  for  the  pair  GCO_Size  and 
Ind_CF, and many are not significant at conventional levels. This suggests that the explanatory 
variables  proxy  for  distinct  underlying  factors  and  that  our  regression  results  should  not  be 
biased due to a potential problem of serious multicollinearity among regressors. 
The cross-sectional regression results are presented in Table 6. We run a Reset test to exclude 
problems of incorrectly omitted variables and/or incorrect functional form, and we conduct a 
Breush-Pagan and a White test to control for the presence of heteroscedasticity. As shown in 
Table 6, none of the Reset tests is significant at conventional levels; the opposite result holds for 
the  Breush-Pagan  and  White  tests.  As  such,  although  we  do  not  seem  to  face  specification 
problems, our estimation must account for the presence of heteroskedasticity. Consequently, and 
drawing on Lang and Stulz (1992) and Haensly et al. (2001), we estimate equation (5) using 
weighted least squares (WLS), with weights equal to the reciprocal of the standard deviation of 
the market model residual for the industry portfolio.
13  
We now analyze our VW results. Table 6 shows that the coefficient estimated for Ind_Lev and 
Ind_Conc  is  positive  and  significant  while  the  coefficient  estimated  for  the  interaction  term 
between these two industry characteristics is negative and significant at better than the 1% level. 
It follows that, ceteris paribus, the GCO competitive effect as measured for the largest of the 
industry rivals is driven by the more highly levered and concentrated industries. However, for a 
given level of industry competition, an increase in the industry’s average debt ratio seems to 
mitigate the impact of the GCO on the industry rivals’ market prices. In addition, the coefficient 
associated with Ind_CF is negative and significant at conventional levels. Hence, in line with our 
initial expectations, our regression results indicate that similarity of cash-flows between rivals 
and announcing firms reduces the magnitude of GCO competitive effect. Table 6 also shows that 
                                                 
13 In untabulated results we use two-step generalized least squares (Green, 2002, pp. 227-228) and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
with heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics (Zhang, 2010) to estimate equation (5). In general, the estimated coefficients have the 
same sign and magnitude as reported below. Nevertheless, some of the estimates are no longer significant at conventional levels 
when we employ these alternative estimators.  17 
 
the  specific  characteristics  of  the  announcing  firms  impact  the  GCO  competitive  effect’s 
magnitude. In particular, all else being equal, rival’s abnormal performance around the GCO date 
is reduced as the size of the announcing firm increases, a result we attribute to the lessening of 
the surprise associated with the disclosure of the GCO report for the larger event firms. In line 
with our initial expectations, there is also evidence suggesting that the GCO competitive effect is 
more acute when the event firm is relatively more profitable. Finally, Table 6 suggests that a 
positive  earnings  surprise  mitigates  the  intra-industry  effect  under  analysis:  the  coefficient 
estimated for SUE_d is -0.004, with p-value of 0.067.  
In  general,  EW  and  VW  results  are  largely  consistent.  There  is,  however,  one  important 
exception. The coefficient estimated for Ind_Lev and for the interaction term between industry’s 
debt level and concentration is not significant at conventional levels in our EW regression. This 
is at odds with our VW evidence and suggests that the indebtedness of the industries is only 
important to explain the cross-sectional variation of the GCO competition effect for the largest 
rivals.  
In short, this section examines the cross-sectional determinants of the short-term impact of 
GCOs  on  the  industry  rivals.  Such  intra-industry  effect  is  stronger  in  more  concentrated 
industries and when competitors and announcing firms have distinct assets in place and growth 
opportunities.  Firm-specific  characteristics  are  also  important.  In  particular,  the  GCO 
competitive effect is magnified when the announcing firm is relatively more profitable but is 
lessened when a positive earnings surprise accompanies the disclosure of the qualified audit 
report.  Finally,  industry  leverage  seems  relevant  for  explaining  the  extent  of  the  GCO 
competitive  effect  only  in  the  case  of  largest  industry  rivals.  Ceteris  paribus,  such  effect  is 
concentrated on the more highly levered industries; however, for a given degree of industry 
competition, higher levels of industry indebtedness reduce rivals firms’ ability to exploit the 
GCO.  
 
5. Valuation effects of the announcement of a GCO: longer-term analysis 
In an efficient market, the GCO should be priced as soon as the audit report becomes publicly 
known (Fama, 1970). Previous studies, however, show that the market is less then fully efficient 18 
 
in many situations, and especially so when it has to deal with bad news events. For example, 
Womack (1996) finds that new sell recommendations are associated with a post-recommendation 
drift of -9% over a 6-month period. Dichev and Piotroski (2001) show negative abnormal returns 
of between -10% to -14% following Moody’s bond downgrades in the first year alone, with a 
further decline of -3% to -7% in the second and third years. Chan (2003) reports that stocks 
associated with bad public news stories display a negative drift for up to 12 months.  
In a recent paper, Kausar et al. (2009) find that the market does not process the going-concern 
opinion signal on a timely basis in the U.S., leading to a significant market underreaction of -
14% over the following 12-month period. Parallel evidence is presented by Taffler et al. (2004) 
for the U.K. market. These two papers show that the market does not fully and quickly reflect the 
impact of the GCO on the announcing firm’s market price. Below we extent these results by 
investigating to what extent a similar market pricing anomaly equally occurs at the industry 
level.  
 
5.1 Initial evidence 
There  is  much  discussion  in  the  literature  regarding  long-term  event  studies.  Two  main 
methods for assessing and calibrating postevent risk-adjusted performance are usually employed: 
1) the buy-and-hold model (Barber and Lyon, 1997) and 2) the calendar-time portfolio approach 
(Fama, 1998; Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) argue 
that event-time returns, as employed by the buy-and-hold method, are an inappropriate metric for 
computing long-term abnormal returns since they  present cross-sectional dependence. Barber 
and  Lyon  (1997),  however,  show  that  the  arithmetic  summation  of  returns,  as  is  done  with 
calendar-time returns, does not precisely measure investor experience. Moreover, Lyon et al. 
(1999)  demonstrate  that  the  calendar-time  method  is  generally  misspecified  in  nonrandom 
samples,  while  Loughran  and  Ritter  (2000)  argue  that  such  technique  has  low  power.  Not 
surprisingly, Kothari and Warner (2007) conclude that we still lack an undisputable method for 
conducting long-term event studies after reviewing the literature. Therefore, below we use both 
methods to examine the longer-term market reaction of industry rivals to the disclosure of a 




5.1.1 Buy-and-hold risk adjusted returns 
We broadly follow Barber and Lyon (1997) when computing buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs). Hence, for period τ , industry i ’s BHAR is: 
( ) ( )
2 2
1 1
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τ τ
τ
τ τ = =
  = + − +   Π Π   (6) 
where  , i t r  is the VW or EW return for industry i  at time τ  and  ( ) , i t E r  is the expected return for 
industry  i  at time τ . In our application,  ( ) , i t E r  is estimated using the returns of firms matched 
on size and book to market since Barber and Lyon (1997) show that the market model is subject 
to the issue of mean reversion. Our matching procedure is similar to that of Zhang (2010) and is 
defined as follows. First, each stock present in CRSP is assigned to one of ten size deciles based 
its market value of equity at the end of June. Next, we choose the firm in the same size decile as 
the firm in the industry portfolio that has the closest book-to-market ratio, which is computed as 
the most recent book value of equity at the end of December divided by the market value of 
equity at the end of December. Finally, both VW and EW portfolios are constructed with the 
returns of the matched  firms thus  generating our measure  for  ( ) , i t E r  in equation (6)  above. 











= ∑   (7) 
where  , i BHAR τ  is defined as in (6), and  n  is the number of industries available data for the 
period. Drawing on Lyon et al. (1999), we compute bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic 
for inferring about the statistical significance of the average BHARs.
14,15 A month is defined as a 
twelve 21-trading day interval (e.g., Michaely et al., 1995) and we restrict our analysis to a one-
year  postevent  period  as  considering  longer  horizons  is  methodologically  challenging  (e.g., 
                                                 
14 We winsorize our results at the top and bottom 1% to reduce the impact of extreme observation in our results.  
15 Standard cross-sectional t-tests yield similar results to those reported below. These are available upon request from the first 
author.  20 
 
Brown and Warner, 1980; Lyon et al., 1999; Kothari and Warner, 2007). For completeness, we 
also compute BHARs for the announcing firms using essentially the same procedure as for the 
industry portfolios described above.  
Table 6 presents our results. Panel A summarizes the preevent stock abnormal performance. 
As can be seen, industry rivals do particularly poorly prior to the disclosure of the GCO report. 
Indeed, on average, the VW (EW) industry portfolio loses 9.3% (p<0.001) (9.7%; p<0.001) of its 
market value on a risk-adjusted basis over the one year period preceding the GCO date. Results 
for the shorter six-month preevent period are qualitatively similar. As argued in section 4 and 
shown in Table 2, on average, industry rivals generate a negative return on equity in the fiscal 
year that precedes the announcement of the GCO report, which  could help explain why the 
market penalizes the industry rivals in the preGCO period. Panel A of Table 6 also shows that 
the announcing firms earn strong negative average SBM risk-adjusted returns in the preevent 
period. Our results thus show that both the GCO firms and their nonGCO industry peers sustain a 
considerable loss in equity value on a risk-adjusted basis before the GCO report is publicly 
known.  
Panel  B  summarizes  our  postGCO  results.  We  find  that  both  the  average  VW  and  EW 
industry BHAR computed for the first postGCO month is positive and significant; most of the 
subsequent industry BHARs are, however, not significant at conventional levels.
16 In contrast, 
the postGCO average BHARs for the announcing firms are mostly negative and statistically 
significant. These results clearly show that the market fails to promptly impound the full impact 
of the GCO report into stock prices.  
Kausar et al. (2009) already document such market pricing anomaly but focus exclusively on 
the announcing firms. Our original results allow us to question the degree of market efficiency in 
the GCO context but now at the industry level. This is particularly puzzling given that we deal 
with industry portfolios and not with single, small, neglected and very distressed firms. It follows 
that it is hard to rationalize our findings simply by drawing on the usual argument that limits to 
arbitrage impede prices to converge rapidly to fundamentals. 
                                                 
16 The average EW post-event BHAR computed for the (+2,+63) window is also positive and significant. However, the same 
does apply to its VW counterpart.   21 
 
It is also interesting to note that prior to the GCO announcement, both the event firms and 
their industry competitors are penalized by the market on a risk-adjusted basis. Accordingly, on 
average, investors seem to worry similarly about the future prospects of all the firms in the 
industry.  This  changes  once  one  of  the  industry  firms  receives  qualified  audit  report.  In 
particular, shareholders of such firm continue to lose money on a risk-adjusted basis over at least 
a full one-year postevent period. In contrast, the nonCGO industry competitors earn positive (in 
the  short-term)  or  not  statically  significant  (in  the  longer-run)  abnormal  returns.  Hence,  our 
results suggest that GCOs are a powerful public signal that helps resolve market uncertainty. 
 
5.1.2 Calendar-time portfolios 
As mentioned above, Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) highlight some potential 
pitfalls  when  computing  BHARs,  and  favor  the  calendar-time  portfolio  approach.  As  an 
additional robustness test, we also employ this alternative method here (see also Eberhart et al., 
2004 and Zhang, 2010). For this test, we compute VW and EW industry returns for our industry 
competitors using data collected from the CRSP monthly tape. Each rival industry is included in 
a  rolling-calendar  portfolio  at  the  GCO  report  disclosure  month,  and  is  hold  there  up  to 
maximum of 6- or 12-months. Industries are given the same weight in the calendar portfolio in 
all months (Zhang, 2010). Following Mitchell and Stafford (2000), and Ikenberry and Ramnath 
(2002), we drop from the analysis all months where the rolling calendar-portfolio has fewer than 
10 industries.  
The calendar-portfolio abnormal performance is assessed using the Fama and French’s (1993) 
three- and the Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model. A Breush-Pagan and a Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation  LM  test  are  employed  to  test  for  the  presence  of  heteroskedasticity  and 
autocorrelation, respectively. None of the Breush-Pagan tests are significant, an indication that 
heteroskedasticity is not an issue in our application. However, the LM test indicates that serial 
correlation is present in almost all of our regressions using VW industry returns. As such, below 
we present the usual OLS t-statistics, which are corrected for the presence of autocorrelation 
when appropriate.  22 
 
Table 8 summarizes our findings. In panel A we examine the preGCO period. As can be seen, 
all VW intercepts are negative and significant at conventional levels. Results for the EW industry 
returns  are,  however,  somewhat  weaker.  Indeed,  we  can  only  find  negative  and  significant 
intercepts when we analyze the shorter 6-month preevent window. Nevertheless, our calendar-
time results do seem to suggest that industry rivals are doing poorly before the GCO report 
becomes publicly known.  In panel  B of Table 8 we examine what occurs once the GCO is 
disclosed. In line with the evidence presented in the previous sub-section, most intercepts are not 
statistically significant suggesting that we are not able to earn risk-adjusted excess returns in the 
postGCO period by investing in the industry portfolios.  
In a nutshell, our calendar-time results are in line with our BHAR evidence presented above. 
In  particular,  we  find  that  GCO  industries  earn  negative  excess  returns  prior  to  the  GCO 
announcement date on a calendar-time basis. Moreover, postevent the market seems to correctly 
price the stock of the GCO firm’s rivals as the risk-adjusted industry portfolios’ excess returns 
are no longer statistically significant. We thus conclude that GCOs help investors resolve some 
of the market uncertainty. 
 
5.2 Multivariate evidence 
In this section we test which industry and firms characteristics can help explain the cross-
sectional  difference  in  the  postGCO  equity  returns  to  the  industry  portfolio.  Our  regression 
model is again given by equation (5) but now the dependent variable is the 21-day post-event 
size and book-market industry BHARs.  
As  shown  in  Table  9,  none  of  the  Reset  tests  is  significant,  which  suggests  that  our 
specification is robust to problems of omitted variables and incorrect functional form. However, 
all Breush-Pagan and White tests are significant at conventional levels. A such, we estimate 
regression (5) using WLS, with weights equal to the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the 
market model residual for the industry portfolio.
17 
We find that the coefficient estimated for Ind_CF is negative and significant at the 5% level, a 
result that holds for both VW and EW abnormal returns. Thus, ceteris paribus, shareholders of 
                                                 
17 Using a two-step generalized least squares approach or OLS with heteroskedasticity-robust t-statistics does not alter the nature 
of our conclusions.  23 
 
the nonevent firms benefit more from the disclosure of a GCO report when the industry rivals 
have assets in place and investment opportunities that are different from those of the announcing 
firms. In addition, Table 9 shows that the coefficient associated with GCO_ROA is positive and 
significant when both VW and EW BHARs are used as dependent variables in our regression. In 
line with our initial predictions, this suggest that, all else being equal, industry rivals are likely to 




This paper explores whether the disclosure of going-concern audit report significantly affects 
the market returns of other publicly-trade rival firms. Using a sample of 670 firms receiving a 
qualified  audit  report  in  the  U.S.  between  1994  and  2005,  we  provide  original  evidence 
suggesting that GCOs lead to an important intra-industry competitive effect. In particular, the 
equity market value of a value-weighted (equally-weighted) portfolio of industry rivals increases 
by 0.37% (0.24%) on a risk-adjusted basis at the GCO date. This small percentage increase in 
market value is nevertheless very interesting from an economic standpoint as we conservatively 
estimate  it  to  be  worth  in  excess  of  $171  billion,  in  2009  constant  dollars.  Further  analysis 
reveals that, in the short-term, the GCO competitive effect depends on some industry (degree of 
competition and cash-flow similarity) and GCO firm-specific characteristics (profitability and 
earnings surprise effect at the 10k disclose date).  
In the second part of the paper we explore the longer-term stock price performance around the 
GCO date. We find that competitors lose, on average, around 9% of their market value over the 
one  year period preceding the GCO date. This  compares to an  average loss of 77% for the 
announcing firms and suggests that investors worry about the future prospects of both event and 
nonevent  firms  before  the  GCO  report  is  publicly  known.  The  postGCO  returns  of  the 
announcing  firms  and  their  respective  competitors  are,  however,  quite  different.  The  former 
continue to earn negative and statistically significant abnormal returns for at least a full year after 
the GCO date. In contrast, industry rivals enjoy positive and significant (not significant) risk-
adjusted  abnormal  returns  in  the  first  postGCO  month  (subsequently).  Taken  together,  these 24 
 
results have two main implications. First, they show that the market is unable to correctly price 
the impact of GCOs on both the announcing firm and its industry peers on a timely fashion. 
Second,  GCOs  seem  important  for  resolving  at  least  some  of  the  uncertainty  surrounding 
industries.  
Overall our results add to the literature exploring the pricing implications of GCOs and the 
literature analyzing how negative public news impacts the market prices of industry rivals. More 
generally, our findings help shed light on how mandatory accounting regulations influence the 
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Table 1: Sample Selection and Distribution by Year 
This table summarizes the sample construction strategy and the distribution of cases by year. 
Panel A: Sample selection 
We start by identifying on EDGAR all 10k reports that mention the words “raise substantial doubt” and “ability to 
continue  as  a  going  concern”  between  01/01/1994  and  12/31/2005.  Conditional  on  a  firm  having  data  in  the 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT merged database, we manually verify if the company has a GCO audit report in that fiscal 
year and if the previous fiscal year is clean in order to identify the first-time GCO companies. We then exclude all 
cases that filed Chapter 11 before the audit report publication date, all firms classified as foreign or as development 
stage enterprise, and cases with insufficient CRSP/COMPUSTAT data. Next, utilities and financials are deleted. 
Finally, we exclude all GCO cases for which we cannot find at least one industry rival (defined as having the same 





Firm-year observations identified through 10k wizard 
 
29,102 
Firm-year observations not found in CRSP/Compustat merged 
 
16,866 
Firm-year observations that do not constitute First-time GCM 
 
9,940 
Firm-year observations with insufficient CRSP/COMPUSTAT data 
 
1,017 
Firm-year observations classified as utilities or financials 
 
142 
Firm-year observations classified as foreign or as in a development stage 
 
168 
Firm-year observations filing Chapter 11 before audit report publication date 
 
45 
Firm-year observations without at least on valid industry rival 
 
254 




Panel B: Sample Distribution by Year 
 
Year    Frequency    Percentage 
1994    15    2.2% 
1995    37    5.5% 
1996    49    7.3% 
1997    68    10.1% 
1998    68    10.1% 
1999    70    10.4% 
2000    48    7.2% 
2001    95    14.2% 
2002    101    15.1% 
2003    69    10.3% 
2004    22    3.3% 
2005    28    4.2% 




Table 2: Summary statistics 
This table presents summary statistics relating to the GCO firms and their industry rivals. Industry rivals are defined 
as firms sharing the same 4-digit SIC code as the announcing firm and that have data available on both CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT. Size is the equity market capitalization in $m, measured one month before the GCO date. Assets is 
total assets in $m. Revenue is total revenues in $m. ROE is the return on equity, computed as the ratio of net income 
to book value of equity. CF Operations is the cash-flow from operations in $m. Z-score is a composite measure of 
financial distress based on Zmijewski (1984). Big 4 is a dummy that assumes the value 1 if the firm is audited by a 
Big 4 audit firm or one of its predecessors and zero otherwise. All accounting data is collected from the 10k report 
disclosed one year before the GCO announcement date. 
 
























































































































































Table 3: Abnormal returns associated with GCO announcements 
This table presents the short-term industry effect associated with GCOs. The abnormal return (AR) is the market 
model  residual  (estimated  over  the  -250,  -50  day  interval)  in  percent. The  sample  includes  all  GCOs  between 
01/01/1994 and 12/31/2005 for which a primary 4-digit SIC code is available from the COMPUSTAT data file (670 
GCOs). An industry portfolio is a value-weighted (VW) or an equally weighted (EW) portfolio of firms with the 
same primary 4-digit SIC code for which returns are available from the CRPS files. N denotes the number of 
abnormal returns to compute the average abnormal return. The significance of the AR is computed as in Boehmer et 
al. (1991). 
Panel A: Announcing firms’ average abnormal returns around the GCO announcement date 
Event Day  N  Mean  Sign. 
-5  669  0.40%  0.505 
-4  668  0.29%  0.802 
-3  668  -0.38%  0.283 
-2  668  0.12%  0.835 
-1  668  0.30%  0.497 
0  666  -1.69%  0.000 
1  667  -1.92%  0.000 
2  669  -1.14%  0.035 
3  669  0.81%  0.152 
4  669  1.98%  0.013 
5  668  0.65%  0.100 
 
Panel B: Industry rivals’ average abnormal returns around the GCO announcement date 
Event Day  N  VW Mean  VW Sign.  EW Mean  EW Sign. 
-5  670  0.03%  0.769  0.07%  0.797 
-4  670  0.22%  0.193  0.15%  0.351 
-3  670  0.21%  0.348  0.35%  0.001 
-2  670  0.01%  0.557  0.12%  0.148 
-1  670  0.15%  0.209  0.13%  0.448 
0  670  0.37%  0.008  0.24%  0.023 
1  670  -0.01%  0.587  -0.01%  0.650 
2  670  0.14%  0.112  0.00%  0.908 
3  670  0.20%  0.008  0.09%  0.183 
4  670  -0.16%  0.054  -0.11%  0.179 
5  670  0.09%  0.955  0.15%  0.166 
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Table 4: Cumulative abnormal returns associated with GCO announcements 
This table presents the cumulative short-term industry effect associated with the disclosure of GCO report. The 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is the market model residual (estimated over the -250, -50 day interval) in 
percent. The sample includes all GCOs between 01/01/1994 and 12/31/2005 for which a primary 4-digit SIC code is 
available from the COMPUSTAT data file (670 GCOs). An industry portfolio is a value-weighted (VW) or an 
equally weighted (EW) portfolio of firms with the same primary 4-digit SIC code for which returns are available 
from the CRPS files. N denotes the number of abnormal returns to compute the average abnormal return. The 
significance of the AR is computed as in Boehmer et al. (1991). 
Panel A: Announcing firms’ average cumulative abnormal returns  
Period  N  Mean  Sign. 
(-6; -2)  669  0.03%  0.639 
(-1; 0)  668  -1.39%  0.005 
(-1; 1)  668  -3.31%  0.000 
(2; 6)  670  3.37%  0.002 
 
Panel B: Industry rivals’ average cumulative abnormal returns  
Period  N  VW Mean  VW Sign.  EW Mean  EW Sign. 
(-6; -2)  670  0.34%  0.136  0.47%  0.021 
(-1; 0)  670  0.41%  0.010  0.23%  0.091 
(-1; 1)  670  0.36%  0.066  0.14%  0.428 
(2; 6)  670  0.16%  0.803  -0.02%  0.803 
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Table 5: Summary statistics of independent variables 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the independent variables used to explore the determinants of the short-
term industry effect associated with the disclosure of a GCO report. Panel A reports the summary statistics for such 
variables, and Panel B presents the Pearson correlation coefficients. Ind_Lev is measures the industry’s level of 
indebtedness (total debt to total assets). Ind_Conc is the Herfindahl ratio, computed as the squared sum of the 
fractions of the industry sales (higher values indicate a more concentrated industry). Ind_Lev_Conc is an interaction 
variable, computed as Ind_Lev times Ind_Conc. Ind_CF is a proxy for the degree of similarity in cash flows between 
the industry and the announcing firm (measured as the coefficient of correlation of raw returns over the one year 
period preceding the event date). LGCO_Size is the announcing firm’s log of total assets (in $m, computed with 
data collected from the 10k report disclosed one year prior to the GCO report date) and is used to capture the 
information environment surrounding the event firms. GCO_ROA is the ratio of earnings before earnings and taxes 
to  total  assets  and  measures  the  pre-event  profitability  of  the  announcing  firm.  SUE_d  is  a  dummy  variable 
assuming the unit value the GCO report is accompanied by a positive earnings surprise, and zero otherwise. P-
values are presented in parentheses.   
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Table 6: Cross-sectional analysis of industry rival’s short-term abnormal equity returns 
This table presents the coefficient estimates of cross-section regressions for the short-term industry abnormal returns 
for  a  sample  of  670  events.  The dependent  variable  is  the  cumulative  abnormal  stock  returns  for  the  industry 
portfolio from a market model for the (-1,+0) daily interval, where Day 0 is the disclosure of the GCO report. 
Ind_Lev is measures the industry’s level of indebtedness (total debt to total assets). Ind_Conc is the Herfindahl ratio, 
computed as the squared sum of the fractions of the industry sales (higher values indicate a more concentrated 
industry). Ind_Lev_Conc is an interaction variable, computed as Ind_Lev times Ind_Conc. Ind_CF is a proxy for the 
degree of similarity in cash flows between the industry and the announcing firm (measured as the coefficient of 
correlation of raw returns over the one year period preceding the event date). LGCO_Size is the announcing firm’s 
log of total assets (in $m, computed with data collected from the 10k report disclosed one year prior to the GCO 
report date) and is used to capture the information environment surrounding the event firms. GCO_ROA is the ratio 
of earnings before earnings and taxes to total assets and measures the pre-event profitability of the announcing firm. 
SUE_d is a dummy variable assuming the unit value the GCO report is accompanied by a positive earnings surprise, 
and zero otherwise. An industry portfolio is a value-weighted (VW) or an equally weighted (EW) portfolio of firms 
with the same primary 4-digit SIC code for which returns are available from the CRPS files. Models are estimated 







Estimate  Sig. 
 
Estimate  Sig. 
Intercept 
 
-0.031  <.001 
 
-0.021  0.001 
Ind_Lev    0.089  <.001    -0.015  0.221 
Ind_Conc 
 
0.026  <.001 
 
0.009  0.077 
Ind_Lev_Conc 
 
-0.115  <.001 
 
0.014  0.478 
Ind_CF 
 
-0.021  0.053 
 
-0.039  0.001 
LGCO_Size 
 
-0.002  0.003 
 
0.002  0.630 
GCO_ROA 
 
0.003  0.068 
 
0.006  0.001 
SUE_d 
 
-0.004  0.067 
 
-0.005  0.024 
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Table 7: Longer-term industry abnormal equity returns associated with GCO announcements 
This table presents long-term abnormal equity returns  for the industry portfolios and  announcing firms for the 
sample of 670 GCO events using the size and book-to-market matched model (SBMM). The SBMM calculates the 
abnormal equity returns for a value-weighted (VW) or equally weighted (EW) industry portfolio in excess of the 
returns of a value-weighted (VW) or equally weighted portfolio (EW) matching portfolio constructed with size and 
book-to-market firms. The match firm is in the same size decile as the firm in the industry portfolio and has the 
closest book-to-market ratio. Panel A (B) reports the average SBMM BHARs for the preevent (postevent) period. P-
values are computed using bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics as in Lyon et al. (1999). 
 
Panel A: Preevent returns  
  VW    EW    GCO firms 
Period  Mean   Sign.  Mean  Sign.  Mean   Sign. 
(-252; -2)  -0.093  <0.001  -0.096  <0.001  -0.744  <0.001 
(-126; -2)  -0.035  0.032  -0.027  0.071  -0.439  <0.001 
 
Panel B: Postevent returns 
VW    EW  GCO firms 
Period  Mean   Sign.  Mean  Sign.  Mean   Sign. 
(2; 21)  0.015  0.036  0.019  0.001  -0.003  0.831 
(2; 63)  0.013  0.262  0.013  0.018  -0.079  0.002 
(2; 126)  0.003  0.851  0.025  0.121  -0.138  <0.001 
(2; 189)  0.008  0.710  0.073  0.112  -0.166  <0.001 




Table 8: Longer-term industry abnormal equity returns associated with GCO announcements - 
robustness 
This table presents long-term abnormal equity returns for the industry portfolios for the sample of 670 GCO events 
using the calendar-time portfolio model. An industry portfolio is a value-weighted (VW) or an equally weighted 
(EW) portfolio of firms with the same primary 4-digit SIC code for which returns are available from the CRPS files. 
Industries are added to the calendar portfolio at the GCO disclosure month and held for 6- or 12-months. Portfolio 
returns are computed assuming an equally weighted investment strategy. Months where the portfolio holds less than 
10 stocks are deleted. The abnormal performance of the industry portfolio is assessed using Fama and French’s 
(1993) three-factor and Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model. The parameters are estimated using OLS. The p-value of 
standard  (autocorrelation  robust)  t-statistics  is  reported  in  parentheses  (brackets).  N  is  the  number  of  calendar 
portfolios considered in the estimation. 
Panel A: Preevent returns  
Value-Weighted industry returns 
Holding Period  N  Intercept   Sig.  R2  Pricing model 
6 Months  119  -0.0028  [<.001]  71.0%  Carhart 
6 Months  119  -0.0027  [<.001]  71.6%  FF 
12 Months  140  -0.0024  [<.001]  62.3%  Carhart 
12 Months  140  -0.0025  [<.001]  62.0%  FF 
Equally Weighted industry returns 
Holding Period  N  Intercept   Sig.  R2  Pricing model 
6 Months  119  -0.0096  (<.001)  86.0%  Carhart 
6 Months  119  -0.0048  (0.016)  81.3%  FF 
12 Months  140  0.0030  (0.206)  88.2%  Carhart 
12 Months  140  -0.0001  (0.962)  84.4%  FF 
 
Panel B: Postevent returns  
Value-Weighted industry returns 
Holding Period  N  Intercept   Sig.  R2  Pricing model 
6 Months  119  -0.0017  (0.654)  56.7%  Carhart 
6 Months  119  -0.0017  (0.226)  56.9%  FF 
12 Months  140  -0.0031  [0.452]  48.8%  Carhart 
12 Months  140  -0.0032  [0.314]  71.7%  FF 
 
 
Equally Weighted industry returns 
Holding Period  N  Intercept   Sig.  R2  Pricing model 
6 Months  119  0.0122  (0.041)  80.9%  Carhart 
6 Months  119  0.0073  (0.101)  76.4%  FF 
12 Months  140  0.0011  (0.527)  85.3%  Carhart 
12 Months  140  0.0057  (0.189)  77.8%  FF 
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Table 9: Cross-sectional analysis of industry rival’s short-term abnormal equity returns 
This table presents the coefficient estimates of cross-section regressions for the long-term industry abnormal returns 
for  a  sample  of  670  events.  The dependent  variable  is  the  cumulative  abnormal  stock  returns  for  the  industry 
portfolio from a market model for the (+2,+21) daily interval, where Day 0 is the disclosure of the GCO report. 
Ind_Lev is measures the industry’s level of indebtedness (total debt to total assets). Ind_Conc is the Herfindahl ratio, 
computed as the squared sum of the fractions of the industry sales (higher values indicate a more concentrated 
industry). Ind_Lev_Conc is an interaction variable, computed as Ind_Lev times Ind_Conc. Ind_CF is a proxy for the 
degree of similarity in cash flows between the industry and the announcing firm (measured as the coefficient of 
correlation of raw returns over the one year period preceding the event date). LGCO_Size is the announcing firm’s 
log of total assets (in $m, computed with data collected from the 10k report disclosed one year prior to the GCO 
report date) and is used to capture the information environment surrounding the event firms. GCO_ROA is the ratio 
of earnings before earnings and taxes to total assets and measures the pre-event profitability of the announcing firm. 
SUE_d is a dummy variable assuming the unit value the GCO report is accompanied by a positive earnings surprise, 
and zero otherwise. An industry portfolio is a value-weighted (VW) or an equally weighted (EW) portfolio of firms 
with the same primary 4-digit SIC code for which returns are available from the CRPS files. Models are estimated 
using weighted least squares and include both year and industry dummies.  
VW  EW 
Independent Variable  Estimate  Sig.  Estimate  Sig. 
Intercept  -0.120  0.021  -0.113  0.029 
Ind_Lev    0.058  0.537    0.080  0.394 
Ind_Conc  0.030  0.395  0.032  0.349 
Ind_CF  -0.165  0.008  -0.149  0.015 
Ind_Lev_Ind_Conc  0.027  0.833  -0.009  0.946 
LGCO_Size  0.005  0.324  0.004  0.359 
GCO_ROA  0.016  0.016  0.020  0.070 
SUE_d  0.003  0.786  0.001  0.980 
Reset (F-Stat. Sig.)  0.591  0.188 
White (F-Stat. Sig.)  0.067  <.0001 
B.-P. (F-Stat. Sig.)  <.0001  <.0001 
R-Squared  5.7%  6.5% 
   